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UNITED STATES v.
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD.:
USE OF FEDERAL "FALSE STATEMENTS ACT"
TO EXTEND JURISDICTION
OVER POLLUTING INCIDENTS INTO
TERRITORIAL SEAS OF FOREIGN STATES
Shaun Gehan*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 1999, the United States Department of Justice announced
a record $18 million settlement with Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (RCCL)
ending criminal cases for environmental law violations against the company
pending in six federal district courts in five different circuits.' Anticipating
its impact, former Attorney General Janet Reno stated: "This case will
sound like a foghorn throughout the entire maritime industry."2 This
settlement followed one for $9 million in June 1998 with RCCL for similar
violations in two jurisdictions.'
Reno's statement rings true, and does so beyond the simple facts
relayed in the press release. Certainly the case was important for establish-
ing a high floor for particularly egregious violations of U.S. anti-pollution
laws such as the Oil Pollution Act of 199O and the Clean Water Act.5
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2002.
1. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Royal Caribbean to Pay Record $18 Million Criminal Fine for
Dumping Oil and Hazardous Chemicals, Making False Statements, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/July/316enr.htm (July 21, 1999). Criminal indictments
are being filed in Miami, New York City, Los Angeles, Anchorage, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin
Islands, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. "The 1998 pleas.., involved charges that the company engaged in a fleet-wide
conspiracy to dump oil into U.S. coastal waters and lied to the U.S. Coast Guard to cover
the crime by falsifying oil logs required by law." Id.
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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However it is the use of the federal Fraud False Statements Act,6 (False
Statements Act or § 1001), as a basis for criminal charges culminating in
the 1998 settlement that portends a real clarion call to the international
maritime community.
On February 1, 1993, the RCCL-owned cruise ship Nordic Empress
was found discharging oil in violation of the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships7 by a U.S. Coast Guard aircraft
equipped with special infra-red radar.' What makes this situation unique
from all other violations charged against the company is that the discharge
occurred in the territorial sea of the Bahamas, not the United States.
Ordinarily, the United States would have no jurisdiction to prosecute such
a crime. To overcome this limitation, however, the United States charged
the company solely with a violation of the False Statements Act, to wit,
presenting a falsified "Oil Record Book" to Coast Guard officials when the
vessel made port in Miami.9 The court in United States v. Royal Carib-
bean Cruises, Ltd. rebuffed all arguments that the United States lacked
jurisdiction over this offense,'" allowing the prosecution to go forward, and
ultimately prompting the settlement.
This Note examines this use of a domestic law of general applicability
to essentially extend State jurisdiction into that of other sovereign States in
order to further the aims of conventional international law. Some might
argue that by so employing § 1001, the United States ran roughshod over
the sovereign rights of both the Nordic Empress's flag State, Liberia, and,
to some extent, that of the coastal State damaged by the discharge, the
Bahamas." This Nnote will argue, however, that such applications of
domes-tic law are entirely consistent with the aims of the applicable
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
7. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 1319; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983)
[hereinafter MARPOL].
8. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., II F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361-62 (S.D.
Fla. 1998).
9. Id. The Nordic Empress's Oil Record Book, required to be carried under MARPOL,
of course, contained no notations referring to illegal discharges of oil. Id.
10. Id. at 1363-1374.
11. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arts. 218, 220, 228,
Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
[Vol. 7:1
U.S. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
international treaties 2 and offer a viable means of protecting the marine
environment, particularly when flag States themselves are hesitant to act.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME ON POLLUTION
While there are many treaties dealing with the problem of marine
pollution on the high seas,' 3 the primary instruments which lay out the
international legal and regulatory regime are the United Nation's Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 1982, (UNCLOS)' 4 and the Protocol of 1978
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, 1973, collectively known as "MARPOL."' 5  Unlike the
UNCLOS, which was negotiated under the auspices of a United Nations
conference, MARPOL was negotiated by member nations of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO), a separate and smaller multilateral
body formed in 1948.16
A. Differences Between UNCLOS and MARPOL
With respect to maritime pollution regulations, the mandates of the two
instruments are somewhat overlapping. However, it is important to note the
differences between UNCLOS and MARPOL. According to Agustin
Blanco-BazAn, an IMO Senior Deputy Director, UNCLOS has more the
status of a "'Constitution of the oceans"' whereas MARPOL sets out a
highly detailed regulatory framework, specifically enforceable amongst the
signatory States. 7 Elaborating, Blanco states:
12. See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1368 ("Rather than barring this § 1001
prosecution, MARPOU/APPS seems to complement § 1001 so as to maximize pollution en-
forcement efforts in both the domestic and international arena [sic].").
13. See, e.g., The International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403; The International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,1969, reprinted in 64 AJIL
481 (1970), with protocol, London, Nov. 19, 1976, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 617 (1977).
14. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at pt. XII, § 5.
15. MARPOL, supra note 7; see also International Maritime Organization, An
introduction to IMO, at http://www.imo.org/imo/introd.htm (visited February 10, 2001)
[hereinafter IMO website].
16. IMO website, supra note 15.
17. Agustin Blanco-Bazdn, IMO interface with the Law of the Sea Convention,
presented at Twenty-Third Annual Seminar of the Center Ocean Law and Policy, Univ. of
Virginia School of Law (Jan. 6-9,2000), at http://www.imo.orglimo/Library/paperslblancol
blanco.htm [hereinafter IMO interface].
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UNCLOS provisions.., aim at the effective implementation of
substantive safety and antipollution rules, but in the end they
remain basically jurisdictional provisions, namely, provisions
which regulate the features and extent of state jurisdiction but not
the enforcement of measures regulated in other treaties. Compli-
ance with IMO rules and standards cannot be dissociated from the
treaty framework in which these rules and standards are contained.
Thus UNCLOS obligations to enforce IMO rules and standards
should be understood as operative on condition that parties to
UNCLOS also become parties to the IMO conventions where these
rules and standards are contained."
With respect to the oil pollution rules, however, UNCLOS contains very
specific port State jurisdiction rules 9 and responsibilities that come very
near to the regulatory scope of MARPOL.2° Blanco refers to this section
as "unique" when contrasted with the overall "umbrella" framework
approach of UNCLOS as a whole.2'
The significance of this fact, it seems, is that it suggests a large degree
of consensus was garnered among States on the importance of combating
marine pollution in all ranges of the oceans. This consensus enabled
UNCLOS member States to negotiate fairly specific measures addressing
the problem. This specificity, however, is relative to the more hortatory
language of other sections of UNCLOS and stands in starker contrast to the
regulatory document that is MARPOL. To highlight the difference
between the scope of each, Blanco states:
Both treaties aim at the protection of the marine environment by
means of ensuring that antipollution preventative measures are
properly implemented. However, UNCLOS focuses more on
measures to be taken to prevent and penalize discharges in ocean
spaces while in the case of MARPOL violations are not only
related to illegal discharges but also to the non-compliance of
preventative measures to be applied on board irrespective of
whether discharges [occur].22
18. Id.
19. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 218. UNCLOS also contains rules covering flag
and coastal States. Id. at arts. 217, 220.
20. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, at pt. XII, § 5 ("International Rules and National
Legislation to Prevent, Reduce and Control Pollution of the Marine Environment");
MARPOL, supra note 7.
21. IMO interface, supra note 17.
22. Id.
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Thus, both treaties generally speak to whom has jurisdiction with
respect to proceedings against a vessel for violations,' though UNCLOS
is the more authoritative on these questions. MARPOL, on the other hand,
goes much further specifying, for example, the need for tankers of a certain
size to have segregated ballast tanks' and for member nations to provide
certain port side facilities.25
B. Specific MARPOL and UNCLOS
Provisions Relevant to Royal Caribbean
MARPOL requires the maintenance of an "Oil Record Book" for
logging disposal of all regulated materials. 6 This book must also reflect
any accidental (or intentional) discharges.27 The Oil Record Book "shall
be kept in such a place as to be readily available for inspection at all
reasonable times."'  Such rules aid enforcement of MARPOL, which is
largely done through States exercising port State control initiatives to
ensure compliance.29 Thus, for example, port State authorities are entitled
to examine a foreign vessel's Oil Record Book, required certificates, and
inspect machine spaces and equipment.30
Both UNCLOS and MARPOL give port States significant authority to
sanction foreign flag violators committing violations of the conventions
within their territorial waters or exclusive economic zones (EEZ)." That
23. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 228; MARPOL, supra note 7, at art. 4.
24. MARPOL, supra note 7, at Annex I, Regulation 13. The United States has not
ratified UNCLOS, but some courts have recognized it as law. See United States v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.P.R. 1998) (noting that "[a]lthough the
treaty arising from the convention [UNCLOS] is currently pending ratification before the
Senate, it nevertheless carries the weight of law from the date of its submission by the
President to the Senate.").
25. MARPOL, supra note 7, at Annex I, Regulation 12.
26. Id. at Annex I, Regulation 20 (1).
27. Id. at Regulation 20(3). The time of the recordation is to be when the discharge
occurs. Id. at Regulation 20(4).
28. Id. at Regulation 20(5).
29. See id., arts. 5, 6; see also Dr. Heike Hoppe, Port State Control-An Update, IMO
NEWS 1/2000, at http://www.imo.org/publications.
30. MARPOL, supra note 7, at Annex II, pt. A. For example, MARPOL requires ships
to maintain an Oil Water Separator which must be certified to reduce oil contaminated bilge
waste to the required level of 15 parts per million. Inspection of both the certificate and
equipment are permissible, and ships can be detained if either are found deficient.
31. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 220; MARPOL, supra note 7, at art. 4. Neither
even attempts to delineate any international limitations on enforcement of domestic
laws-pollution or otherwise-in a State's ports or internal waters. The only constraints
these sections pose on a port State is with respect to measures it may undertake to respond
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authority is more restricted with respect to violations including "substantial
discharge[s] causing or threatening significant pollution of the marine
environment," beyond theirjurisdiction." Flag States (or the "Administra-
tion of the ship" in MARPOL terminology) have the right to be informed
of all violations, and appear to have authority to preempt a port State's
investigation and institute their own proceedings.33 Under UNCLOS,
penalties for violations of both "national laws and regulations [and]
applicable international rules" are restricted to monetary levies only, unless
the violations occur in a State's territorial waters and constitute "a wilful
and serious act of pollution. 34 MARPOL holds that any violations "within
the jurisdiction of any Party to the Convention shall be prohibited and
sanctions shall be established therefor under the law of that Party. 35
These treaties are not self-executing, but rather must be implemented
by member States through national legislation.36 In the United States, the
to treaty violations from the territorial sea outward.
32. UNCLOS, supra note 1I, at art. 220; MARPOL, supra note 17, at art. 6.
33. It appears that on the plain language of UNCLOS Article 220, port States have
plenary power to investigate and punish violations occurring within theirjurisdiction, subject
only to the limitations on criminal punishment contained in Article 230. However, the
reference to "applicable international rules" in Article 220.3 can be inferred to mean
MARPOL. See IMO interface, supra note 17. MARPOL gives flag States preemptive rights
in all cases noting that "[i]f an inspection indicates a violation of the Convention, a report
shall be forwarded to the Administration for any appropriate action." MARPOL, supra note
7, at art. 6(2) (emphasis added). While MARPOL, Article 4(2)(a), allows a State to institute
proceedings for treaty violations occurring within its jurisdiction under its own laws, section
(b) allows referrals to the flag State, and Article 4(3) and Article 6(2), taken together, appear
to grant the flag State the right of preemption. An example of this process is given by the
Royal Caribbean Court:
Based upon the suspicion that an alleged discharge violation had occurred, the United
States referred this matter to a representative of the government of Liberia via the
Department of State. The referral letter addressed an "alleged discharge violation" but
referred the Coast Guard Report in its entirety, including the reference to potential
violations of the Oil Record Book, to Liberia. On February 10, 1994, Liberia filed its
Determination that there was reasonable doubt that the Nordic Empress was in
contravention of MARPOL and that it was "difficult" to respond to the allegations of
"improperly recorded" Oil Record Book entries under the facts as presented, and
recommended expunging the allegation. There was no appeal for reconsideration or
review made to the International Maritime Organization pursuant to the protocol set
forth in MARPOL.
United States v. Royal Carribean Cruises, Ltd., II F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361-62 (S.D. Fla.
1998). This right of review of disputes and the process to be employed are outlined in
MARPOL, Article 10 and Protocol II.
34. UNCLOS, supra note 1I, at art. 230(2).
35. MARPOL, supra note 7, at art. 4(2).
36. Royal Caribbean, II F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
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provisions of MARPOL have been codified through the Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships (APPS).37
m. CASES
A. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
In 1998, the United States charged the Miami-based cruise ship
company, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., with "the knowing use or
presentation of a false writing, specifically an Oil Record Book for the
cruise ship the Nordic Empress, during a United States Coast Guard
inspection on February 1, 1993."38 Royal Caribbean moved to dismiss on
several grounds.39 Three of these related to domestic U.S. law, three others
were premised on international law.' Of greatest relevance here, RCCL
argued that because the violation supporting the Fraud and False State-
ments Act4' claim occurred outside of U.S. jurisdiction, "the necessary
predicate for a § 1001 claim, a false statement over which there is
jurisdiction, cannot be established." '42 Secondly, it argued that APPS is
specific legislation that preempts application of the more general statute,
§ 1001."' RCCL also argued that "binding provisions of international law
under both MARPOL and UNCLOS" preempted this prosecution." And,
finally, that this prosecution was contrary, as a matter of policy, to the Law
of the Sea Convention. 5
1. Application of Domestic Law
The thrust of nearly all of the Defendant's arguments was that the
prosecution was centered on the polluting incident occurring in Bahamian
37. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915 (1994).
38. Royal Caribbean, I I F. Supp. 2d.. Thus violating Section 1001 of the Fraud and
False Statements Act.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
40. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
41. See supra note 6.
42. Royal Carribean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
43. Id. The third claim dealt with principles of lenity, due process, and notice. RCCL
tried to argue that ambiguities in the scope of the penal provisions favored dismissal of the
charges. The court rejected these arguments. Id. at 1362, 1365-66 (distinguishing United
States v. Apex Oil, 132 F.3d 1287 (11" Cir. 1997)).
44. Royal Carribean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
45. hd at 1362.
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waters,' and thus the United States was without jurisdiction over the
matter, both under domestic and international law. The court rejected all
such suggestions. RCCL argued that since MARPOL imposes the duty to
report discharges at the time of discharge, then the offense, if any, occurred
outside of U.S. jurisdiction.47 The Royal Caribbean court "start[ed] with
the premise that jurisdiction based upon § 1001 should not be unnecessarily
confined.... [T]he fact that the alleged false statement.., was not made
within the jurisdictional bounds of the United States is not necessarily fatal
to the claim."'48 MARPOL, the court continued, imposes a duty on the
United States to "board and inspect ships while in port and to pursue
appropriate measures to address any violations thereof."'49 Given that such
inspections are "part of the regularly conducted activities of the [U.S.]
Coast Guard," the court held that "false statements made in connection with
those activities" were "within the jurisdiction of § 1001. "50
Interestingly, the court went on to find an alternate basis for jurisdic-
tion: "[T]he extraterritoriality doctrine provid[es] jurisdiction over certain
extraterritorial offenses whose 'extraterritorial acts are intended to have an
effect within the sovereign territory.'. 5 This potentially sweeping mandate
was not justified-as was the first ground-on any notion of international
law, but rather by a finding that U.S. laws are necessarily undermined by
"deliberate use of false documents" within the sovereign territory.52 The
court then rejected the notion that the existence of specific regulations
promulgated under APPS, and designed to give effect to MARPOL's rules,
"impliedly repealed" application of § 1001 on the theory that the specific
trumps the general.53 Instead, the Royal Caribbean court held that absent
express congressional intent, APPS was intended to "supplement and not
repeal existing laws." '54
46. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
47. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1364.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942,950 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
52. Id. Though the court did not elaborate, it is entirely plausible that false Oil Record
Book entries are "intended to have the [territorial] effect" of speeding the ship through an
IMO inspection and to avoid various liabilities, some of which may accrue to the port State.
Id.
53. Id. at 1364-65.
54. Id. at 1365.
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2. Application of International Law Principles
Turning to the international law contentions, the court refused to hold
that MARPOL and UNCLOS precluded this prosecution.55 The court heard
extensive expert testimony on international law at the request of the
Defendant.56 RCCL argued that port States are limited in their role by
MARPOL to "providing assistance to the flag state by enforcing the
recordkeeping requirement through inspections," referring any alleged
violations to the flag state, and that the U.S. has no jurisdiction to enforce
Oil Record Book violations outside of its navigable waters.57 The
government responded that MARPOL does not and cannot limit United
States jurisdiction to enforce its criminal laws in internal waters and ports5"
and that RCCL has no standing to "litigate rights under international law
treaties[,] as treaty rights... accrue to sovereign nations."59 The court
agreed with the United States, stating that individuals have such standing
only under treaties that are "self-executing,"' which MARPOL is not.6
The court, however, refused to decide whether RCCL had standing to
seek rights under MARPOL, because it held no treaty rights were
violated.62 "Rather than barring this § 1001 prosecution, MARPOL/ APPS
seems to complement § 1001 so as to maximize pollution enforcement
efforts in both the domestic and international arena."63 While respecting
55. Id. at 1369-74.
56. Id. at 1361. Testifying were: Elliot Richardson, former Ambassador-at-Large and
Special Representative to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea; Professor
Bernard Oxman, a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Third Conference; Rear
Admiral Paul Blaney, Chief Counsel, U.S.C.G.; Capt. Thomas Gilmour, of the U.S.C.G.'s
Marine Safety and Environmental Protection office; and Robert K. Harris, Ass't Legal
Advisor for Oceans Int'l Environment and Scientific Affairs, Dept. of State. Id. at 1366.
57. Id. at 1367. "For jurisdictional purposes, the requirements concerning the Oil
Record Book apply to a ship that operates under the authority of a country other than the
United States, such as the Nordic Empress, while the ship is 'in the navigable waters of the
United States, or while at port or terminal under the jurisdiction of the United States.' 33
C.F.R. § 151.09(a)(5)." Id. The term "navigable waters" for the purpose of this section
means the territorial seas, tidal inland waters, and certain non-tidal inland waters. 33 C.F.R.
§ 2.05-25(a) (2000).
58. Royal Caribbean, I I F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
59. Id. For the flag State's response see supra note 33.
60. "A treaty is self-executing if it both requires no implementing legislation and
provides a specific private right of action." Royal Caribbean, I I F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (citing
Haitian Refugees Center v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
61. Royal Carribean, I I F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
62. Id. at 1368.
63. Id.
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the "careful international regulatory balance created by MARPOL," the
court agreed with the government's view that presentation of a false Oil
Record Book in a U.S. port is a separate crime." Nothing in MARPOL, the
court said, requires the U.S. merely to refer this case to Liberia, as the flag
State; whether or not to do so is a policy decision "reserved for consider-
ation by the Executive Branch."65
Turning to certain UNCLOS provisions, which RCCL characterized as
binding law on the United States,' three challenges to the United States
action were made: (1) as the United States initially referred its report on
the polluting incident to Liberia-including the Oil Record Book
violations-it was precluded by the "double jeopardy" provision of Article
228.167 from continuing this prosecution; (2) that the three year statute of
limitations in Article 228.2 had run; and (3) that no request for this
investigation and prosecution was made by either the coastal or flag State,
as required by Article 218.2, thus the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case.68 The United States again argued the standing issue, and further
argued that UNCLOS does not effect a nation's sovereignty with respect to
enforcing criminal laws for infractions occurring in its ports, and, finally,
that even if it did extend so far, the treaty was simply not violated here.69
The court simply could not find any jurisdictional basis for applying
the UNCLOS provisions cited by RCCL to the facts at issue. "The fact that
international issues are implicated is not enough to divest the United States
of jurisdiction.... Presentation of a false Oil Record Book seems more
64. Id. The Royal Caribbean court also agreed with the court in the related case in
Puerto Rico, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 155 (D.P.R. 1997),
that MARPOL, Article 4(2), results in "concurrent jurisdiction" in both the flag State and
the port State. Royal Carribean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
65. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1368-69.
66. Either as a matter of collateral estoppel, because the determination that the district
court in Puerto Rico made with respect to this issue in the sister case, United States v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 155 (D.P.R. 1997), that the United States was so
bound, see id. at 159, or because it reflects customary international law.
67. "When proceedings instituted by the flag State have been brought to a conclusion,
the suspended proceedings [of the coastal State] shall be terminated." UNCLOS, supra note
10, at art. 228.1. After the Coast Guard inspected the Nordic Empress and uncovered the
Oil Record Book violation in February 1993, the United States referred to Liberia "an
'alleged discharge violation,"' but included the Coast Guard report in its entirety. Royal
Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1361. On February 10, 1994, Liberia filed its Determination
that there were no grounds for sanctions, and stated "that it was 'difficult' to respond to the
allegations of 'improperly recorded' Oil Record Book entries under the facts as presented,
and recommended expunging the allegation." Id. at 1361-62. Thus, RCCL is arguing here
that this matter was passed upon and decided by the flag State, as is its' prerogative.
68. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70.
69. Id. at 1370.
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appropriately characterized... as an essentially domestic law violation
over which the United States properly has jurisdiction."70 The Royal
Caribbean court, however, went on to analyze the case under the relevant
UNCLOS provisions, which the court found, on the basis of expert
testimony and case law, to be "properly considered customary international
law."'" As with MARPOL,7" the court refused to decide RCCL's standing
to claim rights under UNCLOS, but analyzed the treaty as if standing
existed.73
The basic principle the court applied to its analysis of customary
international law as reflected in UNCLOS is that "U.S. statutes are not to
be interpreted and applied in a manner inconsistent with international law
if any other interpretation is possible.... ."" The primary conflict to be
resolved revolved around UNCLOS, Article 218, "Enforcement by port
States," which reads:
When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore
terminal of a State, that State may undertake investigations and,
where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings in respect of
any discharge from that vessel outside the internal waters, territo-
rial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation of
applicable international rules and standards established through the
competent international organization or general diplomatic
conference.75
The question becomes: Does Article 218 apply to a criminal charge under
Section 1001 for presenting a falsified Oil Record Book when the falsity of
the statement is "in respect of" a discharge of oil in another State's
Exclusive Economic Zone? Territorial seas? Internal waters? If so, then
where, as here, neither the coastal State (Bahamas) nor the flag State
(Liberia)76 requests action by the port State, Article 218.2 specifically
70. Id. at 1371.
71. Id. at 1372.
72. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
73. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
74. ld at 1372. This is an application of what is known as the "Charming Betsy canon"
which derives from the case Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804). Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529,546 (1999). As the discussion below makes clear, this
canon is shared by other common law States. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
75. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 218.1 (emphasis added).
76. Which not only failed to request the proceeding, but, indeed, lodged a Diplomatic
Note of protest with the U.S. State Department. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
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forbids any proceedings under 218. l." The Royal Caribbean court
resolved the UNCLOS/§ 1001 conflict by holding that "[w]hile the
interpretation of the term 'in respect of' is admittedly imprecise, Article
[218.2] plainly directs its prohibitions to discharge violations and not
domestic port violations."78 In other words, this prosecution is solely about
false statements made in a U.S. port and all the other trappings-the
MARPOL-required Oil Record Book, the location of the act giving rise to
the false statement-are extraneous to the domestic crime.79
The last issue addressed-i.e., that such prosecutions "threaten[] to
upset the international balance of' UNCLOS-was sharply disposed of as
a nonjusticiable political question.80 Said the Royal Caribbean court:
While we appreciate the position of the Government of Liberia as
communicated to us ... , as well as the position of the United
States Department of State regarding this matter.. . , we cannot
take such considerations into account. The arguments concerning
the implications for the international balance of powers presented
by this prosecution are policy arguments concerning matters of
foreign diplomacy, matters by definition most properly reserved to
the executive branch of our government.... 8
B. Analogous Case Law
A search of case law in Canada, the United Kingdom, France,
Australia, and the International Court of Justice revealed no similar
extensions of national jurisdiction against foreign flag vessel, either on the
high seas or into other State's territorial waters, to enforce rights enshrined
in either MARPOL or UNCLOS. In a British case, Pianka v. The Queen,82
however, the Privy Council, hearing the case on appeal, discussed a State's
jurisdiction over a foreign flag vessel in a State's own waters in light of the
77. Royal Caribbean, I I F. Supp. 2d at 1373; UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 218.2.
78. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-74.
79. The court applied similar reasoning to RCCL's contentions under UNCLOS, Article
228.1 (requiring port States to suspend its proceedings when the flag State conducts its own)
and 228.2 (noting that "Proceedings to impose penalties on foreign vessels shall not be
instituted after the expiry of three years from the date on which the violation was committed
.. "). The court reasoned that "[b]y its own terms, Article 228.1 applies to violations
committed at sea[,]" and that "the three-year statute of limitations [in 228.2] is inapplicable
to this matter, as the violation alleged in this action is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, not
UNCLOS." Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-74.
80. Id. at 1374.
81. Id.
82. [1979] A.C. 107, [1977] 3 WLR 859.
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Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of
1958's (1958 Convention) provisions on "the right of innocent passage. "83
Although the main issues in the case involved the jurisdiction of Jamaican
parish courts over summary criminal offenses under Commonwealth law,
the Defendant also set up the 1958 Convention as a defense because the
Jamaican authorities had seized his U.S.-flagged vessel, loaded with
marijuana, within its territorial waters.8 4
Similar to the Royal Caribbean case, Pianka asserted that the State's
assertion of jurisdiction contravened international law, specifically, the
1958 Convention's Article 19.85 While this treaty specifically authorizes
interference with innocent passage in case of "narcotic drug" violations, for
reasons not entirely clear, the Pianka court analyzed the arrest in terms of
Article 19(1)(a) and (b) which authorize arrests of foreign vessels when
effects of the crime either extend to the State or are of a nature likely to
disturb the peace thereof.8 6 As did the Royal Caribbean court, the Privy
Council gave a "liberal construction" to the treaty provisions and found that
the possession of large amounts of marijuana within the territorial seas had
sufficient effect in Jamaica to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. 7
A more closely analogous case is Spain v. Canada.88 There the
International Court of Justice was faced with charges that Canada violated
"principles of international law which enshrine freedom of navigation and
freedom of fishing on the high seas" by seizing a Spanish-flagged fishing
83. 1d at 125.
84. Id. Under the 1958 Convention, territorial seas extended only three miles from the
coastal State's baseline, reflecting customary international law, whereas under the 1982
amendments to UNCLOS, Article 3, territorial seas could be extended out to 12 nautical
miles. Thus, it is quite possible that the incident at issue in Piankas occurred much closer
to the coastal State than did the polluting incident at issue in Royal Carribean.
85. Id. Article 19 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone reads, in relevant part:
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal state should not be exercised on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any
investigation in connexion with any crime committed on board the ship during its
passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state; or
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order
of the territorial sea; or
(c) If the assistance of the local authorities had been requested by the captain
of the ship or by the consul of the country whose flag the ship flies; or
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.
Pianka v. The Queen, [1979] A.C. 126.
86. Pianka v. The Queen, [1979] A.C. 126-127.
87. Id at 128.
88. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 96 (Dec. 4).
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vessel on the high seas for harvesting "straddling stocks" of turbot outside
of Canada's exclusive economic zone. 9 Canada was applying its Coastal
Fisheries Protection Act,' recently amended to target Spanish and
Portuguese vessels fishing on stocks in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization's controlled zones outside of Canada's EEZ.9  However,
Canada withdrew jurisdiction from the ICJ, leaving the issues raised
undecided.92
There is, however, some court record as Gonzalez, the Captain of the
Spanish vessel seized and its corporate owner, brought suit for damages
against the Canadian government under theories of tort including malicious
prosecution.93 Gonzalez argued that his vessel, the Estai, "was subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of Spain pursuant to Maritime Law, established
principles of international law, Spanish Law, Canadian Law, Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958, and Article 92.1 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982."' Plaintiffs
argued that this seizure violated principles of international law, while
Canada argued that the court was without jurisdiction to hear these claims
because they necessitate a judicial determination that international law
supercedes Canadian statutory law on the same point.95 To this point, the
court iterated the familiar rule that "accepted principles of customary
international law are recognized and are applied in Canadian courts, as part
of the domestic law unless, of course, they are in conflict with domestic
law."
The case was solely before the court on a motion by the Defendant to
strike certain pleadings for failure to state a claim-there have been no
substantive determinations yet.97 In allowing the case to go forward,
however, the court held that Plaintiffs may raise the issue of whether the
regulations under which they were arrested were valid under Canadian law,
but found it unnecessary to make
89. International Court of Justice, "Case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.
Canada): Court declares that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute," (December
4, 1998) at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/presscom/iPress I 998/ipr9841.htm (visited January
31, 200 1) [hereinafter ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction].
90. Coastal Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33 (1985) (Can.).
91. Jose Hijos, S.A. v. Canada, No. T-1602-95, 1996 Fed. Ct. Trial LEXIS 72, at *13,
(Fed. Ct. Dec. 13, 1996).
92. ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 89.
93. Hijos v. Canada, 1996 Fed Ct. Trial LEXIS 72, at **6-7.
94. ld. at *10.
95. ld. at **11-13.
96. Id. at *14.
97. Id. at **1-2.
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reference in the pleadings or particulars to specific international
treaties or conventions which, insofar as they are considered a
source of law, will be applied in the action only if they are
incorporated in Canadian domestic law by legislation specifically
so providing. To the extent that international conventions or
treaties are considered authority for international law principles, it
is unnecessary to plead them specifically, in the same way that it
is unnecessary to plead other authority ......
In essence, the court determined that international law will have no role in
the trial, as in Royal Caribbean, unless and only to the extent it is embodied
within, or fails to conflict with, Canadian law. There appears to be no
concern by the court with the extension of jurisdiction beyond Canadian
waters, unless such is shown to be ultra vires under Canadian law and not
conventional, international law.
IV. LAW OF THE SEA IMPLICATIONS
Clearly, as RCCL attempted to argue in federal court, uses of generally
applicable laws against foreign flagged vessels in the manner employed by
the U.S. Justice Department could significantly impact the carefully
balanced jurisdictional rules for environmental enforcement laid out in Part
XII of UNCLOS and MARPOL.99 These provisions sought to limit the use
by port States of criminal law against foreign crew and vessels to a narrow
category of cases involving "willful and serious act[s] of pollution in the
territorial sea. ' '""°
The results of such injections of one State's sovereignty into that of
another simultaneously affect two different interests-those of the coastal
State and of the flag State-and the potential consequences of each may be
different. Of the two, it is arguable that those of the coastal State, to the
extent it takes umbrage and would prefer to take action on its own, is the
more pressing of the two. The coastal State's harm in having its territorial
waters polluted is greater than the affront to the port State official presented
with false statements. There is little danger that coastal States exercising
98. Id. at *15.
99. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1374 (S.D.
Fla. 1998).
100. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 230(2). According to Blanco-Bazn: "Violations
to MARPOL rules resulting in substandard navigation without both wilful misconduct and
polluting discharges can only be sanctioned with monetary penalties." IMO interface, supra
note 17 (emphasis added).
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rights under UNCLOS and MARPOL would do so inefficaciously, given
the interests involved, thus the policies embodied by these agreements are
likely to be upheld.'' Conversely, there is great potential harm to comity
and the system of international law when port States ignore the sovereign
rights of injured coastal States.
On the other hand, there seems little reciprocal danger in pursuing such
actions as against the wishes of the flag State, when, as in the case of Royal
Caribbean, the flag State chooses to ignore persuasive evidence of a
MARPOL violation." 2 Nations operating what are derisively referred to
as "flags of convenience"' 3 (FOC) generally have much more of a
disincentive to punish vessels operating under their flag for violations of
international law than do large port States. This is because the "market" for
flag coverage is quite competitive and there is very little cost to switching
the affiliation of particular vessels. Further, as many flag States represent-
ing a vast amount of the world's tonnage, for example Liberia, are not
themselves large port States (or, as in the case of Luxemb6urg, even
coastal), these States do not face the same threat of coastal pollution as do
States like the United States, members of the European Community,
Canada, Japan, and others receiving large volumes of traffic.
When owners, masters, and crews of vessels flying these flags face the
prospect of criminal liability under laws like the American False Statement
Act, flag States will have a much greater incentive to put in place systems
of meaningful investigation and punishment (presumably short of
reciprocal criminal sanctions) for violations by their vessels on the high
seas and in other State's waters. This is because they would be unable to
provide cover, as Liberia apparently tried to do, by simply exercising
prerogatives under UNCLOS and MARPOL to investigate and dismiss all
charges, thereby shielding their owners from all liabilities."4
101. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
102. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-62.
103. According to the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), an
international federation of labor organizations representing workers in various transportation
related industries, including maritime, flags of convenience "allow shipowners, who have
no genuine link to the flag State, to register their ships there in order to avoid the taxation
and regulation which their own countries would impose." ITF, ITF Maritime Department,
at http://www.itf.org.uk/SECTIONS/Mar/mar.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2001). Among
others, the ITF lists Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Germany (second
register), Honduras, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, and the
world's largest registry, Panama, as flags of convenience. ITF, Flags of Convenience, at
http://www.itf.org.uk/SECTIONS/Mar/FOC-flags/flags_2000.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2001).
104. Royal Caribbean, I F. Supp. 2d at 1361-62.
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This presupposes, of course, that countries like the United States would
forgo the imposition of criminal charges for false statement violations if the
flag State accepts competent evidence and imposes some lesser measure of
punishment. This seems a fair assumption. After all, as the Royal Carib-
bean court noted, while the United States exercised its prerogatives to
investigate a violation occurring beyond its waters, as allowable under
UNCLOS Article 218.1, it fulfilled its duties under subsection 4 by relaying
the results of the investigation to the flag State."5 Only after "Liberia filed
its Determination that there was reasonable doubt that the Nordic Empress
was in contravention of MARPOL" that the United States sought the False
Statements Act indictment.6
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that jurisdictional reach by port States into even
the territorial waters of other States by means of the False Statement Act
does no great violence to the principles of the international law as
embodied in UNCLOS and MARPOL under the circumstances present in
Royal Caribbean if: (1) the coastal State directly affected by the violation
chooses not to pursue remedies under such treaties, and (2) the flag State
demonstrates an unwillingness to punish its violators in the face of
competent evidence of a clear violations. Indeed, an increasing use of such
tools, which by their very terms involve solely matters of domestic
concern,10 7 can have the salutary effect of promoting the aims and spirit
embodied in treaties such as Part XII of UNCLOS and MARPOL.
105. Id. at 1361.
106. Id. at 1361-62.
107. That is, a violation of a domestic statute of general applicability when the violation
clearly occurs in jurisdiction of the port State.
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